A Study on New Tunneling Behaviors by Controlling Shareholders after Non-tradable Share Reform in China by 吴育辉
学校编码：10384                                分类号      密级       





博  士  学  位  论  文 
 
股权分置改革后控股股东新的掏空行为研究 
A Study on New Tunneling Behaviors by Controlling 
Shareholders after Non-tradable Share Reform in China 
吴  育  辉 
指  导  教  师 ： 吴 世 农 教 授
沈 艺 峰 教 授
专  业  名  称 ： 财 务 学
论文提交日期： 2010 年  7 月
论文答辩日期： 2010 年    月
学位授予日期： 2010 年    月
 
答辩委员会主席：         
评    阅    人：         
 


















A Study on New Tunneling Behaviors by Controlling 




































另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）
的研究成果，获得（               ）课题（组）经费或实验室的


































（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 







                             声明人（签名）： 



















和 Means，1932；Jensen 和 Meckling，1976）。但自从 1997-1998 年亚洲金融危
机爆发之后，越来越多的学者开始将关注点集中在控股股东与中小股东之间的代




















































































































































































































































The key point about corporate governance in the firms suggested by Berle and 
Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) is that there exists an agency problem 
between the top management and shareholders. However, since the Asian financial 
crisis happened during 1997-1998, more and more scholars have focused their 
attention on another agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders. 
Since the controlling shareholders may expropriate benefits from minority 
shareholders, Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) call such 
behaviors “tunneling”. 
In China, tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders are pervasive in listed 
firms. One excuse is that ownership concentration is high in listed firms and stocks 
held by controlling shareholders can not be transferred in stock exchanges, which 
results in unconcern for stock prices by controlling shareholders and leads to serious 
interest conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. 
With the beginning of non-tradable share reform since April, 2005, controlling 
shareholders get transferring rights of their stocks by giving up some stocks to 
minority shareholders. At the same time, regulatory institutions, such as China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, or CSRC, and State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council, or SASAC, carry out lots of 
rules to control tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders. Based on this 
background, there are some interesting questions to answer. First, are tunneling 
behaviors disappear after non-tradable share reform？ Second, if there still are some 
expropriations by controlling shareholders in listed firms, how do they exist? Third, 
how does internal corporate governance work to monitor and control such tunneling 
behaviors by controlling shareholders? 
To answer these questions, I first review lots of related literature on tunneling, 
from China and abroad, and do an analysis of institutional background in China. Then, 
I select and discuss three new types of financial behaviors by controlling shareholders 
and listed firms after non-tradable share reform, which are stock-selling behaviors by 
controlling shareholders, equity private placements by listed firms, and executive 
stock options in listed firms, to find out some evidence of new tunneling behaviors in 















controlling tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders and give some 
suggestions for regulatory institutions. 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 is introduction, which briefly introduces the research background and 
motivation, research issues and framework, and research improvements and 
innovations. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literatue on tunneling. In this chapter, I first review 
literature about relation between large shareholders and corporate governance. Then I 
introduce theoretical and empirical studies on tunneling in China and abroad. Finally, 
I make some comments on these papers. 
Chapter 3 first summeries the main characteristics of tunneling behaviors before 
non-tradable share reform, then introduces the proceeding of non-tradable share 
reform in China as well as the changes of controlling shareholders’ interests caused by 
this reform. After that, I analyze the institutional background for stock-selling 
behaviors by controlling shareholders, equity private placements and stock option 
plans by listed firms. 
Chapter 4-6 analyze new tunneling behaviors during stock-selling behaviors by 
controlling shareholders, in equity private placements of listed firms, and in the 
design of executive stock option plans of listed firms, respectively. By case studies 
and large sample analyses, I find out three new types of tunneling behaviors after 
non-tradable share reform, which are manipulation of information disclosure of listed 
firms by controlling shareholders during their stock-selling behaviors, timing and 
temporary listing suspension manipulation in equity private placements, and 
performance indicators manipulation and self-motivation in the design of executive 
stock option plans. Then, I discuss the effects of internal corporate governance on 
controlling each tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. 
Chapter 7 makes conclusions, as well as showing research implications and 
limitations, and pointing out direction for future research on tunneling. 
The main findings of this dissertation are as follows. 
First, controlling shareholders’ interests change dramatically after non-tradable 
share reform in China. Controlling shareholders can only get returns from listed firms 
before non-tradable share reform. However, they can get returns from selling stocks 
after non-tradable share reform. Since their ownership of listed firms doesn’t decrease 















minority shareholders effectively, controlling shareholders still control the listed firms 
and have incentives and power to expropriate from minority shareholders. 
Second, there are new tunneling behaviors after non-tradable share reform. In 
this dissertation, I find that: (1) Controlling shareholders maximize their stock-selling 
returns by rushing forward good news and delaying bad news. (2) Controlling 
shareholders save their payment for new stocks issued during equity private 
placements by timing and temporary listing suspension manipulation. (3) Controlling 
shareholders benefit themselves by self-motivation and manipulating performance 
indicators required in the design of executive stock option plans. 
Third, there are some new characteristics in tunneling behaviors after 
non-tradable share reform. (1) Controlling shareholders use more equity tunneling 
other than cash flow tunneling or asset tunneling after non-tradable share reform. For 
example, they try to tunnel from minority investors directly, particularly from 
potential investors, other than from listed firms. (2) Tunneling behaviors are pervasive 
and serious before non-tradable share reform in China. However, they exist only in 
small parts of firms, and become more and more difficult to discriminate after 
non-tradable share reform. (3) The extent and results of these new tunneling behaviors 
become less serious after non-tradable share reform. 
Finally, I don’t find that internal corporate governance does have effects on 
conrolling new tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders after non-tradable 
share reform. One of the important reasons is that controlling shareholders have 
power to decide the composition of corporate boards. As a result, board members are 
reluctant to monitor those tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders. 
There are three improvements and innovations in this dissertation. 
First, the research issue is new in this dissertation. Different from most of 
previous studies on tunneling behaviors in China, this research focuses on tunneling 
behaviors after non-tradable share reform. By case studies and large sample analyses, 
this paper finds out three new types of tunneling behaviors during stock-selling 
behaviors by controlling shareholders, equity private placements and executive stock 
option plans by listed firms, and discuss new characteristics of such behaviors. In 
addition, this paper also explores how the internal corporate governance works to 
control each new tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders. In conclusion, this 
research not only provides some empirical evidence to support theoretical analysis on 















have better understanding on such new tunneling behaviors, as well as improving 
corporate governance of listed firms and protection of minority shareholders. 
Second, research contents are new in this dissertation. This research explores 
tunneling in new ways. (1) Cash flow tunneling and asset tunneling are very common 
in previous papers in China. In this dissertation, I carry out this study from equity 
tunneling perspective, a new angle mentioned by Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello 
(2008). (2) I concentrate on non-financial manipulation by controlling shareholders, 
such as manipulation of information announcements and manipulation of executive 
stock option plans, other than financial manipulation by controlling shareholders, such 
as earnings management. (3) In most of previous studies, the tunneling behaviors are 
pervasive and easy to find out. However, this paper focuses on those new tunneling 
behaviors that are much more difficult to discriminate. (4) This research pays 
attention on the whole processes of tunneling behaviors, not just on the phenomenon, 
which are very common in previous studies.  
Third, there are some improvements in terms of empirical methods in this paper. 
I use both case studies methods and empirical studies methods to explore new 
tunneling behaviors by controlling shareholders after non-tradable share reform in 
China, making 15 research hypotheses to do this research based on related literature 
and case studies, using logistic regressions to test the probability of tunneling 
behaviors by controlling shareholders, setting up an index to detect manipulation of 
executive stock option plans. I believe the empirical methods in this paper will help 
regulatory institutions and investors to have better understanding about new tunneling 
behaviors by controlling shareholders and to improve corporate governance of listed 
firms in China. 
There are some limitations in this dissertation. One of them is that the three types 
of tunneling behaviors in this dissertation can not cover all tunneling behaviors after 
non-tradable share reform. Another one is that research sample is not quite big, which 
in some extent may affect the robostness of this research. In addition, I do not explore 
the determinants of tunneling behaviors after non-tradable share reform in this paper, 
either. Anyway, in my opinion, studies on new types of tunneling behaviors by 
controlling shareholders will be interesting and challenging topics in the next few 
years both in China and abroad. 
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